

1st DISEC

*Novice
General
Assembly*



TOPIC: Bioterrorism

CHAIRS: Hailey Fiallos, Spencer Stone

LAIMUN XXVIII

December 3-4

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LAIMUN XXVIII

December 3-4

Letter from the Secretaries-General

Dear Delegates,

On behalf of our entire staff, it is our pleasure to welcome you to Session XXVIII of the Los Angeles Invitational Model United Nations (LAIMUN) conference. LAIMUN XXVIII will take place on Saturday, December 3 and Sunday, December 4 of 2022 at the Mira Costa High School (MCHS) campus.

Our staff, composed of over 100 MCHS students, has been working tirelessly to make your debate experience the best it can be. You will find your dais members to be knowledgeable about the issues being debated and MUN procedure. We pride ourselves in hosting a conference that is educational and engaging, and we hope you take advantage of that as you prepare and debate.

At LAIMUN, we value thorough research and preparation. We ask that delegates write position papers following [these directions](#). The deadline to submit position papers to be considered for Committee and Research Awards is Friday, November 25 at 11:59 PM PT. The deadline to submit to be considered for Committee Awards is Thursday, December 1 at 11:59 PM PT.

We also encourage all delegates to read the [LAIMUN Rules of Procedure](#) for conference-specific information and as a reminder of points and motions that can be made during committee.

Feel free to reach out to our staff with any questions or concerns you may have. Delegates can find their chairs' contact information next to their committee profile and the Secretariat's email addresses on the staff page. Any member of the LAIMUN staff will be happy to assist you.

We look forward to seeing you in December!

Sincerely,

Allyssa Lessinger and Brady Stephens
Secretaries-General, LAIMUN XXVIII
secretarygeneral@mchsmun.org



Introduction to the USG

Hi Delegates! My name is Tucker and I'm the Under-Secretary General of General Assembly committees. This is my fourth year in the Mira Costa Model UN program and I am ecstatic to welcome you all to LAIMUN XXVIII.

I'm so excited to see various diplomatic strategies in committee regarding the pressing issues we encounter on a global scale. Our chairs will hold the delegates to high standards of research, diplomacy, speeches, and solutions.

At LAIMUN, we have a strict no pre-written resolutions policy—resolutions can only be worked on at your chair's discretion. Please verify that your work is authentic to ensure all delegates experience a fair and accurate simulation of a United Nations conference.

The Mira Costa Model UN program has provided me with incredible opportunities and lasting memories; I hope that LAIMUN XXVIII will be a memorable experience for you as well! Mira Costa MUN provides a profound opportunity for delegates to gain knowledge, confidence, speaking skills, and most importantly, a new understanding of international relations and current events. All LAIMUN XXVIII staff have worked hard to provide the best experience for everyone in attendance and we wish you the best of luck throughout your preparation!

If you have any questions or concerns, please don't hesitate to reach out to GA@mchsmun.org or other members of the Secretariat. I can't wait to see you in December!

Regards,

Allyssa Lessinger and Brady Stephens
Secretaries-General

Tucker Gauss
Under-Secretary General

Introduction to the Dias

Hey delegates! My name is Hailey Fiallos and I am one of your chairs for 1st DISEC Novice at LAIMUN and could not be more thrilled to be one of your chairs! I am currently a Junior at Mira Costa, meaning this is my third year in the Mira Costa Model UN program. During my Freshman year, I debated at LAIMUN and hope to give all of you the same wonderful experience I had! I was granted the incredible opportunity to debate at NAIMUN in Washington, D.C. this year and have learned a plethora of skills from MUN. I will also be attending the Berlin MUN conference this fall in Germany.

Outside of Model UN, I swim on Varsity for the Costa swim team and have been swimming competitively for 6 years. Along with this, you can catch me listening to Grace VanderWaal, relaxing at the beach, or watching my favorite shows: Love Island UK (the best Love Island), Modern Family, and Brooklyn 99. I love movies, especially comedies, and some of my favorites are Crazy Rich Asians and Pitch Perfect. I am also an avid reader (explaining why I have reading glasses at 16) and am currently obsessed with the Bridgerton series (books > show). My father grew up in New York so my family and I are huge Yankees fans, thus explaining why we named my dog Jeter, after Derek Jeter.

As for the committee, my co-chair and I will be on the lookout for creative and effective solutions which relate directly to the topic and coincide with country policy. Because debate can be a long day, unique and attention-grabbing hooks are always a bonus! Please always feel free

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to contact us with any questions or concerns at disec.nov.laimun.xxviii@gmail.com and I look forward to seeing you all at LAIMUN XXVIII!

Hello everyone! My name is Spencer Stone and I will be one of your two chairs in 1st DISEC Novice at LAIMUN XXVIII. I am absolutely exhilarated to work with each and every one of you. I'm currently a sophomore at Mira Costa, and this is my second year in the Mira Costa Model UN program. I had the opportunity to debate at UCLA as well as other local conferences last year, and I hope to experience more conferences throughout my remaining time in the program. I debated at LAIMUN last year in UNSC Advanced as well, and I hope I can grant all of you as great of an experience as I had.

Outside of MUN, I am on Mira Costa's varsity badminton team, and I have been playing piano for as long as I can remember. In my free time I practice singing in cursive, as I aspire to follow in Grace VanderWaal's footsteps. I also like Raising Cane's Chicken Fingers. I order the box combo, substituting the coleslaw for an extra toast. I also make sure to get an extra sauce.

In committee, me and my co-chair hope to see solutions that don't just address prevention, but programs to educate the public on biological agents. Furthermore, reducing public uproar after attacks is of high importance. Neither of these two approaches will be successful overall if implemented exclusively. If you have any questions or concerns about the committee, or if there is anything you would like to know prior to debating, don't be afraid to ask me or my co-chair Hailey at disec.nov.laimun.xxviii@gmail.com. I am so excited to be a member of the dias, see you all at LAIMUN XXVIII!

Committee Description

DISEC or the Disarmament and International Security Committee is one of six committees under the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is tasked with the maintenance of international security, dealing with issues of disarmament and global threats to peace. Following the creation of the United Nations (and DISEC) after the conclusion of the first world war, DISEC set about to return the world to a state of peace, with its first resolution being an attempt to moderate and regulate the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This goal of maintaining global stability and peace is echoed throughout the history of DISEC. All member states of the United Nations having an equal voice, DISEC has proven to be one of, if not the most influential of all the United Nations bodies (in spite of the fact that it's mandate limits its action to suggestions). DISEC committee sessions are structured in three stages: general debate, thematic discussions, and closing with actions on drafts. This proceeding allows for DISEC to best solve challenges to international security, and work efficiently in creating regulations for various armaments. DISEC works closely with other UN bodies such as the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on disarmament, which has helped achieve lower levels of international armaments. The dais hopes that delegates take the role of DISEC into account when preparing for debate at LAIMUN XXVII.

Topic: Bioterrorism

I. Background

Since the beginning of the 14th century, biological weaponry has accounted for numerous deaths as these toxins and organisms are used to harm humans, plants, or animals¹. Such acts of bioterrorism refer to the use of biological weapons which disseminate disease-causing toxins or organisms. Diseases caused by such weapons cannot confine themselves within a nation's borders, thus accounting for the quick spread of deadly diseases². Because biological weapons pose a grave threat to human nature, the consequences of releasing a biological agent or toxin are extremely dramatic. Such consequences include environmental catastrophes, widespread illness, and economic devastation. Over the past two years, the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated how easily diseases can spread, with over 9 million reported cases in the United States alone. Along with this, recent advancements in biochemistry and biotechnology over the past decade have accounted for faster and more efficient production of biological weapons. In the 1950s, only around 6 countries including the United States, China, and North Korea, were rumored to have bioweapon programs. Although it's more efficient, only a dozen countries in modern times are highly suspected of having developed biological weapons programs. As biological agents are inexpensive and easier to develop, this prospect of military advantage has proven to tempt regimes to use bioweapons.

¹ "Biological Weapons Convention – UNODA." *United Nations*, United Nations, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/biological-weapons/>.

² Edmond Hooker, MD. "Biological Warfare History, Definition, Statistics, Facts on Bioterrorism." EMedicineHealth, EMedicineHealth, 1 June 2022, https://www.emedicinehealth.com/biological_warfare/article_em.htm.

The first uses of biological weapons date back to the 14th century, when Mongol forces captured multiple plague-infested specimens and used them to infect an Italian fleet in the Black Sea³. This first usage of biological weaponry led to the beginning of the Black Death pandemic after the fleet returned to Italy, killing roughly 25 million civilians. Eventually, more immense powers initiated using biological weapons to weaken opposing forces, such as the British in 1763. During the siege of Fort Pitt, British forces delivered handkerchiefs and blankets infected with smallpox to the Native Americans to weaken their advances⁴.

Similar tactics are also present throughout history, including in World War I. In 1918, the Germans established an exclusive program to infect livestock owned by the Allies on both the Eastern and Western fronts, causing an outbreak of zoonotic infectious disease. These horrors of World War I led many countries to sign the 1925 Geneva Protocol⁵, banning the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. Despite the protocol advocating for the ban and control of bioterrorist attacks, countries, such as Japan and the USSR disregarded the values of the protocol because while they may have signed it, both countries did not ratify it and therefore were not constrained by the laws. In 1945, the Japanese government was held accountable for experimenting on and killing over 3,000 Chinese citizens for tests of biological warfare agents and the continual use of biological weapons in war against China.

³ Kiger, Patrick J. "Did Colonists Give Infected Blankets to Native Americans as Biological Warfare?" *History.com*, A&E Television Networks, 15 Nov. 2018, <https://www.history.com/news/colonists-native-americans-smallpox-blankets>.

⁴ Rucoskyjrucosky@tribdem.com, John. "John Rucosky: Fort Pitt Site of One of Earliest Incidents of Intentional Spread of a Virus, Historians Say." *The Tribune-Democrat*, 30 Apr. 2020, https://www.tribdem.com/news/john-rucosky-fort-pitt-site-of-one-of-earliest-incidents-of-intentional-spread-of-a/article_e6a6bd40-8a95-11ea-a73d-e7ea253885a1.html.

⁵ "Geneva Gas Protocol." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., <https://www.britannica.com/event/Geneva-Gas-Protocol>.

For a variety of complex reasons, bioterrorism persists as a dangerous and difficult problem for the international community to resolve. The facet of bioterrorism which must be addressed is preparedness. Because bioterrorism is a high-impact yet low-risk event, proper preparedness is necessary to control and deter an attack. As the infectious agents used are likely endemic to the infected region and are uncommon, it is difficult to use traditional vaccines or medications. Thus, early symptoms after an attack complicate the management of the disease, creating greater public panic. As it can take up to 15 years to develop a vaccine, bioterrorism preparedness requires strengthening technical infrastructure for treating ill patients in a short period. Therefore, countries must consider the potential effect of funding other health improvements and security threats. A notable instance of the positive impact of investment in the healthcare system is the development of the 8 billion doses of the COVID-19 Pfizer vaccine, which were manufactured rapidly and cost a mere \$1.18 per vaccine. Efficient preparedness also includes medical distribution. Due to the effortless spread of biological agents, medical distribution is a difficult task. More developed countries over time have learned to develop programs in response to such fast attacks. For example, the United States has developed the Strategic National Stockpile, which is part of the medical response to infrastructure and can easily supplement medical supplies needed by states during public healthcare emergencies⁶. Such preparedness may be helpful in the event of a biological outbreak.

Another critical factor of bioterrorism is diagnosis. Since the introduction of anthrax agents in 2001, there have been many advances in diagnosis capabilities, such as increased speed

⁶ “Strategic National Stockpile.” *ASPR*, <https://www.phe.gov/about/sns/Pages/default.aspx>.

and reduced cost. The anthrax outbreak in 2001 demonstrated that organisms such as anthrax could respond to antimicrobial therapy in the early stages of diagnosis. However, early signs of these diseases are often nonspecific and can be confused with other diseases, such as the Ebola virus having similar symptoms to a fever. The development of pathogen identification has proven to be a crucial first defense against bioterrorist attacks. When coupled with modern technology, sequencing technology has become more portable, less costly, and multiplexed. Although, it is difficult for countries with underdeveloped healthcare systems to access such highly developed technology. For example, during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Western forces discovered that Iraq used mustard gasses and anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin against Iran. Due to a lack of sufficient healthcare, inefficient healthcare technology to develop proper diagnoses, and poor distribution of medical services, over 1,000 Irani soldiers were killed and 100,000 grew sick. Regardless of the Gulf War defeat, the biological warfare threat from Iraq continues to loom today and has yet to be fully extinguished.

However, one of the significant dangers of bioterrorism is if these weapons fall into the wrong hands. Over the years, much of the concern over bioterrorism has shifted from national ⁷ security to terrorist acquisition. Aum Shinrikyo's efforts in Japan to defuse anthrax in the 1990s display both the difficulties in weaponization and attractiveness to terrorist groups. While biological weapons may be difficult to store, disperse and grow, greater access to biotechnology may allow such groups to mount a successful bioterrorist attack. Even a minor biological agent or toxin, if appropriately dispersed, can cause significant damage to an area and provide a

⁷ RA; Zilinskas. "Iraq's Biological Weapons. the Past as Future?" *JAMA*, U.S. National Library of Medicine, <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9244334/>.

significant political effect. For instance, in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks, anthrax-laced letters were mailed to multiple news organizations in the United States as well as the U.S. Senate⁸. In response to such threats, the United States assembled The Amerithrax Task Force to conduct research on the disease and its origin. Despite the United State's best efforts, 5 Americans died and 17 were sickened, making this the worst biological attack in U.S. history.

What originated in the 14th century has slowly continued to manifest itself in today's society. Despite UN members signing treaties such as the Geneva Protocol, the Australia Group⁹, and the Biological Weapons Convention, the maltreatment of biological weapons continues to manifest in today's society. In 2008, the United States conducted a study¹⁰ that analyzed nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons programs as a potential threat around the globe. The study concluded that around a dozen countries have a biological weapons program. However, technological advances and the increased international flow of information and goods potentially allow this number to expand. Although even if nonproliferation policies fail to halt NBC programs, such measures can slow those programs and persuade countries that these weapons are not in their national security interests.

As a result of these abhorrent instances of bioterrorism, the UN established the Biological Weapons Convention to prohibit the production, transfer, and use of biological weapons in 1975

¹¹. The convention continues to undergo periodic reviews, with the latest being in 2016. As of

⁸ "CRS Report for Congress - Federation of American Scientists." *FAS*, <https://irp.fas.org/crs/RL32391.pdf>.

⁹ "Fact Sheets & Briefs." *The Australia Group at a Glance | Arms Control Association*, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/australiagroup>.

¹⁰ *Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles ... - Procon.org*. https://usiraq.procon.org/sourcefiles/CRS_2-20-08.pdf.

¹¹ "Biological Weapons Convention - United States Department of State." *U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State*, 15 Jan. 2021, <https://www.state.gov/biological-weapons-convention-text/>.

2022, there are currently 183 countries that have signed the treaty, making the convention the most vital norm against biological weapons.

II. UN Involvement

Since the first appearance of modern bioweaponry during World War I, the international community has continued to take action against its usage promptly. This action originated with the drafting and signage of the Geneva Protocol – also recognized as the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare – at the Geneva Conference in June of 1925 by the League of Nations¹². The protocol was later implemented in February of 1928, standing as the global community's first significant action to outlaw chemical and bioweaponry usage in warfare. As the first global agreement regarding the subject, the protocol fails to address various facets of the issue. The protocol prevents the usage of such bioweaponry, but it fails to address the production and development of such weapons¹³. With noticeable oversights and disregard from various signatory states, the global community continued to take action. At the 1969 Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, the United Nations negotiated the terms of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), seeking to prohibit both the production and usage of biological and toxic weapons¹⁴. Entering into effect in 1975, the BWC served as the first-ever

¹² “1925 Geneva Protocol – UNODA.” *United Nations*, United Nations, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/1925-geneva-protocol/>.

¹³ “Geneva Protocol.” *The Nuclear Threat Initiative*, 7 May 2022, <https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/protocol-prohibition-use-war-asphyxiating-poisonous-or-other-gasses-and-bacteriological-methods-warfare-geneva-protocol/>.

¹⁴ “Biological Weapons Convention – UNODA.” *United Nations*, United Nations, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/biological-weapons/>.

multilateral disarmament treaty to restrict an entire category of weapons¹⁵. The convention continually meets every five years to ensure that the global community maintains the topic's relevance. As of 2022, parties from various states worldwide have met at the conference eight times, updating the details of the convention to adapt for changing global circumstances. Despite the enforcement of the convention, various states have still violated its contents. For example, the Soviet Union, prior to its collapse in 1991, and Iraq after the Persian Gulf War violated the convention. This illustrates how further action was crucial to hold states accountable despite the critical measures the BWC took regarding bioweaponry. Therefore, on April 28, 2004, UNSC Resolution 1540 passed unanimously to prevent terrorists and other external forces from obtaining weapons of mass destruction, including bioweaponry¹⁶. The resolution simultaneously brought about the 1540 Committee, an ad-hoc committee overseeing the contents and implementation of the resolution. It has seen more effectiveness than the BWC, preventing members from proliferating nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons by making them adopt legislation against it. In the past, the UN has also issued special projects to address specific biological weaponry cases. In 1999, the UN created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to monitor Iraq's prospective bioweapons and weapons of mass destruction usage¹⁷. The commission took over the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), supervising Iraq and its promise to dispose of biological and chemical

¹⁵ “Fact Sheets & Briefs.” *The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) At A Glance* | Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwc>.

¹⁶ “UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) – UNODA.” United Nations, United Nations, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/sc1540/>.

¹⁷ “Unmovic.” United Nations, United Nations, <https://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/>.

weaponry. The UNMOVIC shows how more specific commissions can be issued to address the ongoing threat of biological weapon production and usage worldwide.

III. Topics to Consider

Creating Measures to Monitor and Enforce Accountability

Despite the creation of past legislation by the international community, such as the Geneva Protocol and the BWC, there is still a lack of enforcement held to signatories of both texts. Because of this, participating states have the means to hold covert biological weaponry programs, raising the primary question of whether or not these programs exist in the first place¹⁸. Researchers speculate that over a dozen countries have a current biological weaponry program, yet none have been adequately confirmed to possess one. Delegates should consider ways to bring accountability to signatories of such programs, ensuring that the terms of those agreements are followed. Such implementations could function similarly to the 1540 Committee – implemented under UNSC Resolution 1540 – which oversaw and confirmed the implementation of the resolution. Delegates can also take a more international approach, with programs similar to UNMOVIC on a larger, international scale. Such programs could involve the monitoring of both biotechnical research as well as biodefense programs, ensuring that members of the global community would not violate the terms of protocols. However, one possible weakness is the lack of cooperation between participating states, especially those accused of possessing bioweaponry programs, with those accused possibly being less willing to participate in such monitoring programs. Such programs could still be highly beneficial to the global

¹⁸ “Biological.” The Nuclear Threat Initiative, 1 June 2022, <https://www.nti.org/area/biological/>.

community. Furthermore, countries with biological weaponry programs likely maintain such programs due to the fear that primary global competitors also possess such capabilities.

Delegates should consider that providing transparency among governments could allow the necessary reassurance to the global community, ruling these defensive measures unnecessary.

The Regulating of Biotechnical Research

With the significant presence of biotechnical research and biodefense programs throughout the global community, it is typical for such research and programs to fall into a gray area regarding bioweaponry. Furthermore, there are effective ways to cover up the development of offensive bioweaponry. By placing regulations on the production and research of biotechnology and biodefense programs, the international community can prevent the violation of any international code. The extent to which such monitoring programs regulate production is entire to the discretion of delegates. Such programs could include the regulation of the testing of pathogens and biological agents. This prospective program could work in tandem with accountability-enforcing measures, as the monitoring of nations allows the regulation of such testing and research. While some facets of this possible solution are crucial, it is not without fault. The research and defense being regulated in the program can still be crucial to developing proper response strategies that mitigate bioweapon-caused mass destruction. Furthermore, many countries have already significantly invested in such research, further complicating possible compliance.

Creating Viable Response Strategies

Because of the nature of terrorist organizations and simply all terrorism as a whole, special precautions must be taken. When defending such bioweaponry cases, the unpredictability, lack of information, and defiance of international law from terrorists pose a significant problem. Formulating effective response strategies can be a powerful method of defense against unpredictable terrorist groups. These responses can be composed of reducing damages from such attacks or preventing them altogether through methods such as investing in research on different pathogens, how they spread, and how bioterrorist attacks can be recognized. Also, informing the public about the effects of bioweaponry can further reduce hysteria and panic. While such strategies could pose effective, it is up to the General Assembly to determine any nuances with these responses, as the solution could come with drawbacks. For example, such responses require extensive research on the future effects of bioweaponry, which can lead to financial difficulties. This directly contradicts other possible solutions proposing a reduction in such research, causing more complications. Because of this, it depends on the General Assembly again to determine a viable way to conduct such research while simultaneously avoiding any violation of international legislation.

Educating the Public

Bioterrorism and biological warfare can quickly instill fear in the public. A notable example is in 2001 in the US when letters containing anthrax were delivered. This led to mass hysteria plaguing the American public, which could have easily led to havoc if the attack had been larger-scale. An effective strategy to prevent this havoc could be calming and informing the public on the effects of bioweaponry. Because of the public's slight knowledge of what attacks

with biological weaponry look like, even the smallest-scale attacks can lead to hysteria. Increasing the public's knowledge about biological attacks can reduce the effects. Reducing public fear of bioweaponry can also lead the public to demand transparency regarding current biological weapons programs led by governments. Delegates should note, however, that educating the public will be unable to succeed independently. Educating the public can reinforce other solutions regarding bioweaponry, ensuring that they can operate smoothly. Reducing public uproar after any biological attack will not prove effective if not implemented alongside other prevention programs.

IV. Case Study

One of the most unexpected yet destructible cases of bioterrorism occurred with the Aum Shinrikyo in 1993. The Aum Shinrikyo – otherwise known as the Supreme Truth – is a cult that believes in a doomsday prophecy¹⁹. The leader, Shoko Asahara, constructed a cult with thousands of followers all over Japan who followed his teachings, stating he was the second coming of Jesus Christ and could travel through time. Over decades, the group had raised well over \$1 billion from new cult members and had plans to buy chemical weapons and produce biological weapons. Despite the group being suspected of criminal activity in the past, law enforcement and national security authorities could not restrict Aum Shinrikyo's activities due to a lack of evidence.

The group's most infamous incident was a bioterrorist attack in Kameido, Tokyo, Japan. In 1993, residents surrounding the headquarters building of the religious group began to file

¹⁹ Nix, Elizabeth. "5 20th Century Cult Leaders." History.com, A&E Television Networks, 10 Dec. 2013, <https://www.history.com/news/5-20th-century-cult-leaders>.

complaints of a foul odor to the local environmental health authorities. As these odors eventually led to appetite loss, vomiting, and nausea, the nearly 300 complaints filed were overlooked as the Aum Shinrikyo refused any sort of inspection of the building's interior. A few days later, an oil-like black fluid emerged from the building. Environmental officials then collected a fluid sample where they found accounts of *Bacillus anthracis*, an anthrax agent. As the epidemic resulted in no deaths but contaminated over 7,000 residents, it was later revealed that the efforts to aerosolize a liquid suspension of *Bacillus anthracis* was an attempt to create an inhalation anthrax epidemic hoping to trigger a world war and lead to Asahara's absolute rule.

Later in 1999, thousands of bearing particles remained in the Kameido area, which contained over 3,000 households. Because many civilians had symptoms similar to those of the 1993 attack, physicians at over 39 medical facilities served the high-risk area by surveying by telephone. Despite the physician's best efforts, none of the workers had seen a case of anthrax prior to the *Bacillus anthracis* outbreak. As this preparedness and training of health professionals reflect poor preparedness for an attack, early recognition and awareness were deemed necessary to properly prepare for a bioterrorist attack. This includes training health professionals to recognize diseases, developing an active national surveillance program, and having laboratories available to confirm suspicions. The Japanese government was also able to conclude that coordination between government agencies and private facilities is deemed necessary in order to combat these attacks effectively.²⁰

²⁰ Takahashi, Hiroshi, et al. "Bacillus Anthracis Incident, Kameido, Tokyo, 1993." *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Jan. 2004, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3322761/#R7>.

While there are an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 spore-bearing particles in the Kameido region, it was concluded that the investigation initially showed the value of high-resolution systems for anthrax in forensic investigation. This value was confirmed in the investigations of the “anthrax letters” sent in 2001 to several government officials in the United States. However, the 1993 attack did not receive any attention until two years later, when the Aum Shinrikyo struck another attack on Japanese subways²¹. The religious group used a chemical weapon called sarin gas, which had been used by the Nazis during the Holocaust and is one of the most lethal gases known to man²². While the Japanese Police forces attempted to raid the Aum Shinrikyo compounds across the country, the authorities were ultimately unsuccessful in locating Asahara who would assume responsibility for both the bioterrorist attack and the deadly gas attacks. Instead of locating Asahara, Japanese authorities discovered tons of chemical weapons used to produce sarin gas as well as plans to buy nuclear weapons from Russia. Again in 1997, a chemist who had previously been a part of the group came forward and admitted to producing the sarin gas for all five gas attacks. As a result, the group's easy access to biological and chemical weapons resulted in 15 deaths and over 12,000 injured civilians.

V. Guiding Questions

1. Has your country previously used biological weapons or developed biological weapons?
2. Has a subnational organization in your country ever used biological weapons?

²¹ “Tokyo Subways Are Attacked with Sarin Gas.” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 13 Nov. 2009, <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/tokyo-subways-are-attacked-with-sarin-gas>.

²² History.com Editors. “Nazi Party.” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 9 Nov. 2009, <https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/nazi-party>.

3. How can the international community enforce existing reforms or uncover clandestine biological weapons programs?
4. How can the international community prevent non-state actors from using and developing biological weapons if international laws do not bind them?
5. How can the General Assembly monitor research on biological agents, and to what extent is it justifiable to conduct such research?

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